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IMMIGRANTS, HEALTH CARE, AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
MEDICAID CUTS IN MARYLAND SUGGEST THAT LEGAL 
IMMIGRANTS DO NOT DESERVE THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Effective July 1, 2005, nearly 4,000 children and pregnant 
women, who were legal permanent residents of the United States, 
became ineligible for Medicaid coverage. 1 This change in 
eligibility terminated the health care coverage of those immigrants 
who resided in the United States for fewer than five years. 2 The 
restriction was part of Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.' s efforts to 
contain Medicaid costs for the fiscal year 2006, and became a part 
of his Budget Bill, which was presented to the Maryland General 
Assembly in January 2005. 3 In April, the Legislature approved the 
budget. 4 This budgetary cut represents a mere .0875 percent in 
savings from the total Medical Assistance Program budget. 5 As 
such, this denial of health care coverage to immigrant children and 
pregnant women in Maryland has sparked negative reactions by 
many of the State's legislators, health care experts, and the legal 
community. 6 
In October 2005, the Legal Aid Bureau filed a lawsuit in 
Montgomery County Circuit Court on behalf of twelve children 
whose medical coverage was terminated on July 1, 2005 as a result 
of the budgetary cuts. 7 The Plaintiffs in Perez v. Ehrlich are 
children residing in either Montgomery, Prince George's, or Anne 
Arundel Counties who relied on Medicaid to cover the costs of 
extensive medical treatment for serious illnesses or the routine 
medical care, screenings, and immunizations which children 
typically require. 8 The complaint filed by the Legal Aid Bureau 
against the Governor alleges that the cuts improperly discriminate 




4. !d. Although legislators "earmarked" $1.5 million so that Ehrlich would continue 
to cover health care services for pregnant women enrolled in Medicaid, it was at 
the Governor's discretion to do so. !d. Pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, 
legislators cannot add money to the budget, although they can reduce or strike out 
items. See MD. CaNST. art. III, § 52 (General Assembly has express power only 
to strike or reduce appropriations in the Budget Bill). 
5. Complaint at 6-7, Perez v. Ehrlich, No. 265850-V (Montgomery County Cir. Ct. 
filed Oct. 26, 2005). Seven million in Medicaid funding was cut from a Medical 
Assistance budget of over four billion. [d. 
6. See Wagner, supra note I; see also Kelly Brewington, Md. is Sued on Children's 
Behalf, BAL T. SUN, Oct. 27, 2005, at 68; see infra Part VJ(B)( I )(b )(vi). 
7. See Complaint, supra note 5. 
8. [d. at 2-5. 
77 
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on the basis of alienage and violate the equal protection rights 
afforded to the Plaintiffs under the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, Article 24.9 The complaint further asserts that the State's 
budgetary cut must be examined under a "strict scrutiny" test, and 
that the discriminatory act does not survive such an analysis 
because it is not justified by a compelling state interest. lo 
Fortunately for the Plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals recently ruled 
in their favor and upheld a preliminary injunction that reinstated 
their Medicaid benefits. II This remedy, however, is only 
temporary, as the overall constitutionality of the restrictions is still 
being litigated. 
The State of Maryland is not alone in trying to find ways to deal 
with the rising costs of Medicaid in the past decade. 12 In 1996, for 
example, the federal government under the Clinton administration 
passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA"), which eliminated federal 
funding of Medicaid for legal immigrants who entered the United 
States on or after August 22, 1996, or who had resided in the 
country for fewer than five years. \3 PRWORA also authorized 
states to determine whether to provide Medicaid coverage to legal 
immigrants once the five-year period expired. 14 As a result of the 
changes to eligibility for federally-funded welfare programs, many 
states opted to continue to use state funds to insure legal 
immigrants who became ineligible under the federal law. IS 
Maryland was one such state which became concerned about the 
gaps in health care coverage for segments of its population and, 
consequently, passed the Welfare Innovation Act of 1997. 16 
Through this Act, the State formalized its commitment to provide 
9. ld. at 7. 
10. ld. 
11. See Ehrlich v. Perez, 2006 Md. LEXIS 691 (Md. Oct. 12,2006). The injunction, 
which ordered the State to restore the benefits until the final disposition of the 
case and to reimburse Plaintiffs retroactively for their medical expenses, was 
originally granted in January 2006 by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. 
ld. at *19. The State subsequently filed with the Circuit Court a Notice of Appeal 
to the Court of Special Appeals and a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. Id. The 
Circuit Court granted a stay as to the payment of retrospective benefits but denied 
a stay as to the remainder of the injunction. ld. In March 2006, the Court of 
Appeals issued a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals. ld. at *20. 
Although the Court of Appeals upheld the preliminary injunction issued by the 
Circuit Court, in so far as medical benefits were to be reinstated as of October 26, 
2005, the date the complaint was filed, the Court of Appeals modified the 
injunction to exclude reimbursement for the costs of Plaintiffs' medical coverage 
from July 1, 2005 to October 26, 2005. !d. at *72-73. 
12. See infra Part II(B). 
13. See infra Part III(B). 
14. See infra Part III(B). 
15. See infra Part III(C). 
16. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 15-103(a)(2)(viii) (LexisNexis 2005). 
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medical care to legal immigrant children and pregnant women who 
arrived in the United States on or after August 22, 1996. 17 
Other states, however, opted to deny access to health care 
services for legal immigrants residing in the country for fewer than 
five years.18 As in Maryland, this raised constitutional challenges 
in state courts. 19 State courts have applied one of the standards 
applicable to an equal protection challenge in order to reach a 
decision on the constitutionality of the state act or statute. 20 While 
some courts have applied the less strict rational basis standard to 
evaluate the constitutionality of the state's actions, others have 
applied the heightened test of strict scrutiny. 21 
This Comment analyzes the issues in Perez v. Ehrlich and then 
concludes that Maryland courts should apply the strict scrutiny 
standard to the recent Medicaid eligibility restrictions undertaken 
by Governor Ehrlich because the restrictions discriminate on the 
basis of alienage. Also, this Comment provides a constitutional 
analysis of the Governor's discriminatory act and concludes that a 
Maryland court should declare it unconstitutional, as the State does 
not have a compelling interest sufficient to pass the strict scrutiny 
test. In reaching this conclusion, it is necessary to discuss many 
topics which affect the policies enacted by states today, including 
Maryland, in cutting segments of the immigrant population from 
Medicaid eligibility. Thus, Part II of this Comment provides an 
overview of Medicaid, its development over many decades, and 
Maryland's own reforms to its Medicaid program in recent years. 
Part III discusses federal Medicaid law, including the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, also 
known as the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, which induced major 
cuts to Medicaid eligibility in state programs, including 
Maryland's. Part IV provides background on immigration policy 
in the United States. A discussion of immigrants' rights and the 
Supreme Court's treatment of federal and state discrimination 
against noncitizens follows in Part V. Part VI explores the 
constitutional issues raised by restrictions to Medicaid eligibility 
which target segments of the immigrant population in both 
Maryland and other jurisdictions. This section includes an analysis 
17. ld.; see also infra Part I1I(C)( I). 
18. See infra Part III(C). 
19. See infra Part VI. 
20. See infra Part VI.; see also WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 268-70 (2004). To survive the rational basis test, a classification need only 
be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 268. Under 
intermediate scrutiny, the classification needs to be "substantially related" to an 
important state interest. ld. at 270. According to strict scrutiny, the classification 
must be "narrowly tailored" to a compelling state interest. Id. 
21. See infra Part VI(A). 
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of how the courts in Maryland should approach the equal 
protection issue in Perez v. Ehrlich through application of the strict 
scrutiny test. Included in this equal protection analysis is a 
discussion of the impacts that such Medicaid cuts have on the 
health care system in general, the health of the uninsured, and the 
resulting concerns raised by legislators and the health care 
community. 
This Comment ultimately concludes that the courts in Maryland 
should apply a strict scrutiny test to the recent cuts in Medicaid 
funding affecting legal immigrants and declare those cuts 
unconstitutional. Furthermore, this Comment emphasizes that the 
State of Maryland would be better served by policies less 
restrictive of the immigrant population's access to health care 
coverage. 
II. BACKGROUND ON MEDICAID 
A. Origins of Medicaid and Its Functions 
Medicaid is a welfare program which is funded jointly by the 
federal and state governments in order to provide health care 
coverage to the poor.22 The program was enacted into law in 1965 
and implemented in 1966 as an accompaniment to Medicare. 23 
The creation of both programs stemmed from a concern for certain 
categories of the population whose health care needs were not 
being met, primarily due to the connection between health 
insurance and employment. 24 While Medicare was designed to 
protect retired workers who could not afford private health 
insurance and who needed the coverage due to age-related health 
problems, Medicaid was designed to assist low-income persons 
who lacked coverage due to unemployment or to lack of access to 
such benefits even when employed. 25 
Medicaid and Medicare also differ in their sources of funding 
and methods of administration. 26 While Medicare is solely a 
federal program, Medicaid is the product of federal and state 
cooperation. 27 Once a state voluntarily establishes a program 
22. DEAN M. HARRIS, HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS 108 (1999). 
23. MARK R. DANIELS, MEDICAID REFORM AND THE AMERICAN STATES 3 (1998). 
24. CHARLES J. DOUGHERTY, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: REALITIES, RIGHTS AND 
REFORMS 164 (1988). In the United States, commercial health insurance is 
generally linked to employment. Id. Thus, it became evident that the health care 
and insurance markets were failing the elderly, the retired, and the poor, who 
were either no longer employed or could not afford private health insurance. Id. 
at 165. 
25. Id. at 164-65. 
26. See HARRIS, supra note 22. 
27. Id. 
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which meets the federal standards,28 the federal government 
provides funding to the state through a system of matching 
grants. 29 The state then administers the program, establishing its 
own eligibility requirements, range of health care services 
available to eligible participants, and the amount providers will be 
paid for such services.3o In short, Medicaid is a compilation of 
fifty-one different programs. 3 1 Although each program is unique, 
federal guidelines require all participating states to provide certain 
basic services, and states can elect to provide other services. 32 
However, there are restrictions imposed by the federal government 
on services that states may not elect to cover with Medicaid 
program funds. 33 
With regard to eligibility for Medicaid, low-income participants 
include both those who are "categorically" eligible because they 
receive certain types of public assistance, such as Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF"), and those who are 
"medicall~ needy" because they have incurred high medical 
expenses. 4 In addition, some nursing home residents qualify for 
Medicaid to cover their nursing home care once their own 
insurance policies or savings have been exhausted. 35 
B. Expansion of Medicaid's Eligibility Requirements and the 
Subsequent Funding Crisis 
When the Medicaid program was first developed, it was 
intended that participants would receive services identical to those 
received by patients holding private health insurance. 36 Thus, 
participants chose their own doctors, and the doctors agreed not to 
hold the patients responsible for the payment. 37 The Medicaid 
28. Id. 
29. See DANIELS, supra note 23. The federal government's matching grants provided 
to the states cover from 50% to 70% of program costs. Id. 
30. See id.; TERESA A. COUGHLIN ET AL., MEDICAID SINCE 1980, at 8 (1994). 
31. COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 30. In addition to the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia administers its own Medicaid program. Id. 
32. Id. at 9. Some of the services that states are required to offer include hospital 
care, physician services, nursing home care, and preventive health services for 
children. Id. States, through their Medicaid programs, can opt to provide such 
services as prescription drugs, care facilities for the mentally retarded, dental, 
optometric, podiatric, and chiropractic care. Id. 
33. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 110. Under the Hyde Amendment, states are 
prohibited from using Medicaid funds to pay for abortions. !d. The Supreme 
Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980), held that it "simply does not 
follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional 
entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected 
choices. " 
34. HARRIS, supra note 22, at 109. 
35. !d. at 109-10. 
36. DANIELS, supra note 23. 
37. !d. at 4. 
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program then reimbursed the health care provider on a reasonable 
cost basis. 38 Because health care providers often received less 
from Medicaid than they would from a third-party insurer, the 
providers began opting not to accept Medicaid patients. 39 In 
response, Congress enacted a federal law that changed the payment 
system under Medicaid, and later repealed the same federal law in 
order to adapt to concerns about payment reimbursements. 40 As 
access to health care providers decreased and costs of treatment 
increased, in part because participants were seeking expensive 
emergency treatments rather than preventive care, many states 
developed managed care programs through which they could better 
control participants', use of health care services. 41 Maryland 
implemented a large-scale managed care plan, known as 
HealthChoice, in 1997, in efforts to cope with a budgetary crisis 
resulting from increased enrollment in Medicaid and health care 
inflation. 42 
C. Maryland's Medicaid Reform 
During the early 1990s, the national recession prompted a 
decrease in state revenues and an increase in state spending. 43 
During this period of economic decline, the number of Maryland 
residents eligible for Medicaid increased significantly.44 During a 
five year span from 1989 to 1994, Maryland's Medicaid budget 
doubled, and the Maryland government sought ways to reduce 
Medicaid spending.45 By 1995, Maryland's Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene' ("DHMH") supported a move towards a 
comprehensive managed care program, rather than a continuation 
38. HARRIS, supra note 22, at 113. 
39. DANIELS, supra note 23, at 4. 
40. HARRIS, supra note 22, at 113. In 1981, Congress passed the Boren Amendment, 
under which states devised their own Medicaid reimbursement systems, but they 
had to abide by a federal standard of reasonable rates. Id. Under the federal 
standard, states had to pay enough for a hypothetical and efficient provider to 
recover its costs, even if the individual provider did not actually recover costs 
after reimbursement. Id. The Boren Amendment was repealed in 1997, however, 
following the onset of successful lawsuits by providers against the states to force 
them to pay Medicaid rates pursuant to the federal standards. Id. Consequently, 
the rates of reimbursement set by states must no longer conform to the standards 
set forth under the Boren Amendment, nor can providers sue states to enforce 
those standards. Id. 
41. DANIELS, supra note 23, at 4. Most hospital emergency rooms accepted 
Medicaid patients; thus it became a more convenient source of treatment for 
Medicaid participants. Id. 
42. See id. at 135, 137; infra Part II(C). 
43. DANIELS, supra note 23, at 136. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 137. For example, the Maryland Access to Care ("MAC") program was 
created in 1991, which sought "to improve access to primary and preventive 
services, encourage more appropriate use of services, improve continuity of care, 
increase provider participation, and reduce Medicaid expenditures." Id. at 139. 
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of specialized programs. 46 Senate Bill 694, which was signed by 
Governor Parris N. Glendening in May of 1995, directed the 
DHMH to plan for comprehensive reforms in Maryland's 
Medicaid program. 47 
In January of 1996, Senate Bill 750, the product of the 
DHMH's efforts, was introduced to the Maryland General 
Assembly and sought an expansion of Medicaid managed care.48 
After several amendments, Senate Bill 750 was passed and a new 
managed care program was to be established beginning in 1997.49 
As planned, the new program, known as HealthChoice, was to 
provide better health care services to Medicaid participants while 
costing less than the then-existing set of programs in Maryland. 50 
Managed care is a type of program in which participants receive 
health care services in a coordinated manner, thus avoiding 
unnecessary services. 51 There are various types of managed care 
programs, yet all share in the goal of reducing health care spending 
while maintaining the quality of care. 52 Notwithstanding such 
goals, there is significant concern that managed care programs 
actually limit patients' access to health care. 53 
III. FEDERAL LA W ON MEDICAID AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
THE LA WS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
A. Trends in Federal Law 
Historically, eligibility for Medicaid was linked to federal and 
state welfare policies. 54 Thus, states were required to cover the 
"categorically needy," such as those receiving assistance through 
46. !d. at 147-48. The High Cost User Initiative was one such program. Id. at 140. 
In 1994, the Maryland General Assembly approved the program in 1994, which 
was designed to cope with the concern that a small proportion of patients 
generated a majority of Medicaid health care costs. Id. at 140, 144. 
47. Id. at 149. 
48. Id. at 152. 
49. Id. at 153. 
50. Id. 
51. ld. at 5. 
52. !d. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider 
Organizations (PPOs) are two types of managed care programs. Id. 
53. See MaryCarroll Sullivan, Ethical Considerations in Managed Care, 66 UMKC 
L. REV. 757, 759-61 (1998) (explaining that managed care involves a system of 
"gatekeepers" whereby the patient must work through a chain of people before 
seeing a primary care physician, and it is only through communication with this 
chain of people that referral to a specialist, if needed, can be granted); see also 
Deborah W. Larios, Barbarians at the Gate? An Essay on Payor Liability in an 
Era of Managed Care, 65 TENN. L. REv. 445, 447 (1998) (elaborating on the 
"gatekeeper" idea and explaining that requiring prior approval of treatment and 
uniquely classifying certain treatments as "experimental," which managed care 
programs will not cover, have contributed to limitations to access for managed 
care participants). 
54. COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 36. 
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Aid to Families with De~endent Children ("AFDC") and Social 
Security Income ("SSI"). 5 States also could elect to cover the 
"medically needy"-. those who become eli~ible for AFDC or SSI 
after paying for high medical expenses. 5 If a state extended 
coverage to the "medically needy," it was obligated to provide 
coverage for pregnant women and children. 57 In addition, federal 
law did not impose any restrictions on states' provisions of 
Medicaid benefits to legal immigrants. 58 Furthermore, 
congressional mandates in the 1980s sought to expand Medicaid 
eligibility for several groups, including pregnant women and 
children. 59 Many states, out of concern for infant mortality and 
poor child health, took advantage of the new mandates and 
options. 60 
B. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act 
In 1996 there were drastic changes to the eligibility 
requirements of welfare programs. 61 President Clinton signed 
PRWORA,62 also known as the Welfare Reform ACt. 63 This law 
was designed to break the cycle of welfare dependency among the 
poor by restricting eligibility for federal benefits and by institutin& 
employment-oriented requirements to promote self-reliance. 
Among the changes, the new law abolished the AFDC program 
and replaced it with T ANF, for which the eligibility requirements 
were more stringent. 65 
55. Id. To qualify for cash assistance through AFDC, the income and assets of 
families with children had to fall below a certain amount, which differed from 
state to state. Id. SSI, a federally funded program, provides cash assistance to 
the poor, the elderly, and the disabled. Id. at 40. 
56. !d. at 44. 
57. Id. 
58. John P. Collins, Jr., Developments in Policy: Welfare Reform, 16 YALE L. & 
POL'y REV. 221, 224 (1997). 
59. See COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 47. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984), required states to expand Medicaid 
coverage to pregnant women and children who met the AFDC income criteria, 
but whose family structure made them ineligible. Id. Also, under the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986), 
states were given the option to extend Medicaid coverage to pregnant women and 
children with incomes above the AFDC level, but below the federal poverty level, 
regardless of family structure. Id. 
60. COUGHLIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 52. 
61. Audrey Singer, Welfare Reform and Immigrants, in IMMIGRANTS, WELFARE 
REFORM, AND THE POVERTY OF POLICY 21, 21 (Philip Kretsedemas & Ana 
Aparicio eds., 2004). 
62. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
63. Singer, supra note 61. 
64. Collins, supra note 58, at 221. 
65. Id. at 241-42. 
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In addition, the new law imposed restrictions on the eligibili~ 
of immigrants in all federally funded welfare programs. 6 
PRWORA conditioned eligibility for immigrants on both 
immigration status and timing of arrival in the United States.67 
The new law made distinctions for eligibility purposes based on 
immigration status as either "qualified" or "unqualified.,,68 
Qualified immigrants include those who are legal permanent 
residents, asylees, and refugees. 69 According to PRWORA, states 
are authorized to restrict federal and state public benefits to legal 
immigrants, and legal immigrants are not eligible· for federal 
means-tested programs for five years following their arrival in the 
United States. 70 In addition, PRWORA stipulates that states have 
the option of providing Medicaid coverage to qualified aliens once 
the five-year period has lapsed. 71 Despite the changes and 
restrictions imposed by PRWORA, the new law does not affect 
emergency Medicaid coverage, including labor and delivery for 
low-income residents whether they are of qualified status or not. 72 
C. PRWORA 's Impact on State Laws 
Notwithstanding PRWORA's congressional authorization to 
restrict the eligibility of both immigrants who arrived before and 
after the new law was enacted, forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia elected to extend Medicaid coverage to those legal 
immigrants who were present in the United States prior to the 
law's enactment. 73 In addition, most states chose to provide 
Medicaid benefits to qualified immigrants who completed the five-
year period, despite the new law's authorization to the contrary.74 
Furthermore, seventeen states, several of which had the highest 
populations of legal immigrants, decided to spend their own funds 
to assist immigrants who became ineligible for federal services 
under PRWORA, thus continuing state-funded coverage for 
immigrants who entered the United States on or after August 22, 
66. See Singer, supra note 61, at 22. 
67. Id. States were authorized to factor into their restrictions on benefits whether 
immigrants were lawfully residing in the United States as of August 22, 1996, or 
whether they arrived after that date. Id. at 23. 
68. Collins, supra note 58, at 225. 
69. Id. 
70. See Stacey M. Schwartz, Beaten Before They Are Born: Immigrants, Their 
Children, and a Right to Prenatal Care, ANN. SURV. AM. L. 695, 709 (1997); see 
also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, § 403(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2265 (1996). Medicaid is considered a 
federal means-tested benefit. See Singer, supra note 61, at 26. 
71. See Schwartz, supra note 70. 
72. Tanya Broder, State and Local-Policies on Immigrants and Public Benefits: 
Responding to the 1996 Welfare Law, 31 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 503,512 (1998). 
73. Id. at 512-13; see also Singer, supra note 61, at 28. 
74. Broder, supra note 72, at 504; see also Singer, supra note 61, at 28. 
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1996. 75 Maryland, for example, opted to preserve Medicaid 
coverage for iIIl1l1,igrant pregnant women and children who would 
otherwise be barred from coverage due to the five-year residency 
requirement. 76 New York, however, quickly incorporated the new 
federal law into its laws and passed New York Social Services Act 
§ 122, which denied benefits to many previously eligible 
immigrants residing in the state. 77 
In addition to changes in eligibility following the enactment of 
PRWORA, states took different approaches in the range of health 
care services they provided. Some opted to provide coverage and 
services comparable to Medicaid, while others, such as Maryland, 
limited health care coverage to pregnant women and children. 78 
1. Maryland's New Law Pledges a Continuation of Medicaid 
Coverage 
In 1997, the Maryland Legislature renewed its commitment to 
provide medical coverage for persons affected by PRWORA. 79 
The new statute provided that the State, subject to budgetary 
limitations, would provide "medical care and other health care 
services for all legal immigrant children under the age of 18 years 
and pregnant women who meet Program eligibility standards and 
who arrived in the United States on or after August 22, 1996, the 
effective date of the federal Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act." 80 Although PRWORA 
authorized every state to deny welfare benefits to legal immigrants, 
in accordance with the new federal guidelines, Maryland, through 
the Welfare Innovation Act of 1997, opted to continue coverage 
for such persons. 81 
IV. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND REGULATION 
A. Brief History of Immigration Law in the United States 
The first century of United States' history was characterized by 
an open door policy of immigration, whereby immigrants were 
viewed as a source of labor and capital in an unsettled country. 82 
75. Broder, supra note 72, at 504,513. 
76. See id. at 513. 
77. See Karin H. Berg, Note, May Congress Grant the States Power to Violate the 
Equal Protection Clause?, A1iessa v. Novello and Title IV of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 17 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 297,301-02 (2003). 
78. Broder, supra note 72, at 513. 
79. See MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 15-103(a)(2)(viii) (LexisNexis 2005). 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. See Dave McCurdy, The Future of u.s. Immigration Law, 20 J. LEGIS. 3, 4 
(1994); Meredith K. Olafson, Note, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the 
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As the 1800s ended, increased immigration was viewed negatively 
and Congress began expanding its restrictions on immigration. 83 
By the early 1900s, the United States sought to restrict 
immigration of certain groups thought to be inferior to the earlier 
immigrant groups.84 Thus, Congress implemented a quota s1stem 
to control the racial and ethnic composition of the country.8 By 
the 1950s, there was a movement towards a more liberal 
immigration policy, and in 1965, the long-standing quota system 
was removed. 86 
As times have changed, Congress has continued to enact 
immigration policies that reflect the needs of the country. In the 
1990s, for instance, Congress passed several laws affecting 
immigration in response to an anti-immigrant sentiment in the 
country.87 One such provision was PRWORA. 88 
V. IMMIGRANTS'RIGHTS 
A. The Rights oj Noncitizens 
Competing values in the United States are often viewed as the 
source of the tension that surrounds the determination of which 
rights to allocate immigrants. 89 At times, the idea of the United 
States as an immigrant nation has conflicted with the idea that 
rights and resources should be allocated to citizens only.9o Thus, 
while noncitizens enjoy many of the protections offered by the 
Constitution, they cannot claim all of the privileges that citizens 
Immigration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433, 434-35 
(1999). 
83. See Olafson, supra note 82, at 535. The first major restrictions on immigration 
were known as the Chinese exclusion laws, which sought to keep Chinese 
immigrants out, as they were viewed as "a less worthy . . . stock of potential 
Americans." McCurdy, supra note 82. 
84. See McCurdy, supra note 82, at 4-5. Italian, Slavic, and Jewish immigrants were 
among the groups viewed as "inferior" by immigrants from Anglo-Saxon 
backgrounds. See DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 9 (West Group, 15th ed. 2005). 
85. McCurdy, supra note 82, at 5. 
86. Id. The Immigration Act of 1965 weakened the preference for European 
immigration by establishing higher immigrant limits for countries outside the 
Western Hemisphere. Id. 
87. See Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996); see also Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
88. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
89. See VICTOR ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
EQUALITY IN AMERICA 161-62 (2005). 
90. Id. According to Romero, these competing values comprise a dichotomy 
between the theories of personhood and membership. Id. For a detailed 
discussion of how the Supreme Court has applied these theories to immigration 
issues, see ROMERO, supra note 89, at 161-78. 
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can claim. 91 The rights to vote and run for federal elective office, 
for example, are .available to citizens only.92 However, there are 
certain general protections offered by the Constitution which 
noncitizens residing in the United States can claim.93 For instance, 
the Constitution does not distinguish between citizens and 
noncitizens in providing due process and equal protection, as the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments extend to all "persons.,,94 In 
addition, noncitizens are guaranteed the freedoms of speech, 
religion, and association. 95 Nevertheless, legislation 
discriminating against immigrants and noncitizens has been 
created at both the federal and state levels.96 To. a large extent, this 
has included restrictions on the rights. and activities of lawful 
permanent residents. 97 
B. Federal Discrimination a/Noncitizens 
The Supreme Court has deferred to Congress' decisions 
regarding immigration, even stating that "over no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it 
is over the admission of aliens.,,98 For this reason, the Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee of due process has not always been 
extended to legal permanent residents, although the Constitution, 
itself, does not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens. 99 
Furthermore, the Court's treatment of federal discrimination on the 
basis of alienage is in contrast with its equal protection 
jurisprudence concerning discrimination on the basis of race, 
national origin, and ethnicity, as the Court has recognized 
Congress' plenary power over immigration and thus has often 
refrained from applying heightened scrutiny. 100 
Discrimination based on race, national origin, and ethnicity is 
considered "suspect" and merits strict judicial scrutiny.101 "Strict 
scrutiny" is one of the three standards of review applied to equal 
protection cases, and is the most heightened form of judicial 
scrutiny. 102 The middle level is "intermediate scrutiny," and is 
91. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 212-13 (2003). 
92. !d. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 212; see also ROMERO, supra note 89, at 1. 
95. See COLE, supra note 91, at 217. 
96. See ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
OF ALIENS 39-50 (1985). 
97. Id. at 29-30. Noncitizens "enjoy decent, but scarcely equal, treatment." !d. at 30. 
98. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (stating that "the power over aliens is of 
a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review"). 
99. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) and discussion infra notes 
105-06. 
100. See HULL, supra note 96, at 47; see also KAPLIN, supra note 20, at 276 n.B. 
101. KAPLIN, supra note 20, at 276. 
102. Id. at 267. 
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primarily applied to gender discrimination. l03 The lower tier is 
known as "rational basis scrutiny" and is a~flied to classifications 
which do not merit review on a higher tier. I 
Where federal, rather than state, discrimination is based on 
alienage, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, which embodies the concept of equal 
justice, has not been violated, although a similar state act would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal 
protection. lOS The Court in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong reasoned 
that while states may not be able to justify discriminating on the 
basis of citizenship, and likely must undergo a heightened scrutiny 
in order to abide by the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the federal government is not as restrained if there are overriding 
national interests for its discriminatory actions. 106 And where such 
overriding national interests existed, only a legitimate interest was 
needed for the act to be considered constitutional. 107 
In Mathews v. Diaz,108 the Supreme Court again assessed the 
constitutionality of a federal statute that affected noncitizens. 109 
There, the Court addressed the issue of whether discrimination 
within a class of aliens was permitted. llo The Court concluded that 
the classification based on alienage was constitutional, as "it is 
unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's 
103. Id. In United States ~. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the Supreme Court 
reviewed the admissions policy of a publicly-funded college, which admitted 
only males, and applied the intermediate scrutiny standard. 
104. See KAPLIN, supra note 20, at 267-68. For example, the Supreme Court in City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. applied the rational basis test to legislation 
drawing a distinction between the mentally retarded and others. 473 U.S. 432, 
432 (1985). 
lOS. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
106. The Supreme Court, in Hampton, held that "there may be overriding national 
interests which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for 
an individual State." Id. at 100-01. The Hampton Court reviewed a federal 
regulation that excluded noncitizens from employment in the federal civil service. 
Id. at 90. The Court invalidated the law, as it was a deprivation of due process, 
and established the standard under which the law should be reviewed. Id. at 116-
17. 
107. !d. at 103. The Supreme Court stated that "[w]hen the Federal Government 
asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule 
which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due 
process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was 
actually intended to serve that interest." Id. The Hampton Court found that the 
government's alleged interests were not sufficient to validate the discriminatory 
law. Id. at 116-17. 
108. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
109. !d. 
110. Id. at 79-80. Plaintiffs in this case challenged the constitutionality of a federal 
statute that made eligible for enrollment in a Medicare supplemental medical 
insurance program residents of the United States who were 65 years or older, but 
that limited eligibility to citizens and lawful permanent residents who had resided 
in the United States for a minimum of five years. !d. at 69-70. 
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eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his 
residence. [And] neither requirement is wholly irrational .... " III 
Thus, the Diaz Court applied a minimum rational basis standard to 
a federally enacted statute based on alienage. I 12 
C. The Supreme Court's Treatment of State Discrimination of 
Noncitizens 
Unlike the Supreme Court's treatment of federal laws that 
discriminate on the basis of alienage, the Court has been somewhat 
inconsistent in its application of standards of review to state laws 
which discriminate on the basis of alienage. 113 As far back as 
1886, the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins l14 held that "[T]he 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution is not confined to 
the protection of citizens." 115 The Court further held that the ri~hts 
of Chinese immigrants were not less because they were aliens. I 6 
Notwithstanding its protection of noncitizens under Yick Wo, 
the Supreme Court began to lessen the constitutional protections 
afforded to noncitizens as the twentieth century began. 117 The 
Court upheld state laws which discriminated against lawful 
permanent residents for several reasons. 118 For instance, in Heim 
v. McCall,119 the Court held that public resources could be 
withheld from noncitizens if a "special public interest" was 
involved. 12o Also, the Court upheld state laws which discriminated 
on the basis of alienage if the resource was viewed as "common 
property" of the citizens of the state. l2l Moreover, the Court 
111. Id. at 83. 
112. Id. In reaching its conclusion that the federal discrimination based on alienage 
was constitutional, the Supreme Court distinguished the federal discrimination 
from the state discrimination at issue in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 
(i 971), which also had conditioned benefits on citizenship and length of 
residency. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84-85 (discussing Graham); see also infra Part 
V(C) for a discussion of Graham. 
113. See generally HULL, supra note 96, at 39-46. 
114. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
115. Id. at 369. The Supreme Court invalidated a local California ordinance requiring 
any person owning and operating a laundry business to meet certain safety 
regulations and to obtain the consent of a board. /d. at 374. The Court found that 
a large number of Chinese immigrants were denied consent for no legitimate 
reason. Id. The Court held that the public administration that enforced the law 
was denying equal protection of the law to noncitizens and violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment. /d. 
116. Id. at 368. 
117. See HULL, supra note 96, at 39-40. 
118. See id. 
119. 239 U.S. 175(1915). 
120. Id. at 191-92, 194; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). At issue 
in Heim was a state law requiring public works employees to be citizens. Id. at 
176. 
121. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138,146-47 (1914) (validating a state law that 
allowed only citizens to hunt wildlife and carry firearms). 
2006] Immigrants, Health Care, and the Constitution 91 
permitted the exclusion of noncitizens from positions that were 
political in nature. 122 Thus, for several decades, the Court gave 
deference to state discriminatory laws. 
It is noteworthy that in the midst of upholding laws 
discriminating against noncitizens, the Supreme Court in 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 123 invalidated a state law 
which discriminated on the basis of alienage. 124 The Court 
reviewed and declared unconstitutional a California statute which 
banned the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to any person 
ineligible for citizenship. 125 At that time, Japanese persons were 
ineligible for citizenship in the United States. 126 The state 
contended that it had the power to bar aliens from fishing as a 
means of conserving fish for its citizens, thus creating a "special 
public interest." 127 However, the Court rejected the state's 
"special public interest" argument and held that it was not 
sufficient to validate the law's discriminatory nature. 128 In 
curbing the state's discriminatory actions towards legal 
immigrants, the Court emphasized that "[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority thus embody 
a general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide 
'in any state' on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens 
under non-discriminatory laws.,,129 The Court further held that 
"the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien 
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."I30 
Moving forward several decades to 1971, the Supreme Court, in 
Graham v. Richardson, 131 continued protecting the interests of 
noncitizens from state discriminatory actions by applying a more 
stringent standard of review. 132 In Graham, the Court analyzed 
whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prevented the State of Arizona from conditioning welfare benefits 
either upon the beneficiary's possession of United States 
citizenship, or, if not a citizen, upon the beneficiary's having 
resided in the country for a certain number of years. 133 The Court 
122. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1978) (upholding a state statute 
requiring police officers to be citizens). 
123. 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
124. Id. at 422. 
125. [d. at 413-14, 422. 
126. !d. at 412. 
127. Id. at 417-18. 
128. !d. at 421. 
129. !d. at 420. 
130. [d. The Court stated that although Congress, drawing on its powers over 
immigration and naturalization, has the power to specially classify groups of 
people, the states do not have the same authority. Id. 
131. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
132. !d. at 372. 
133. Id. at 366. 
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applied strict scrutiny and concluded that the state's desire to 
preserve limited welfare. benefits for its citizens did not justify 
discriminating against noncitizens; thus, the statute violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. 134 The Graham Court's protection of 
aliens and application of a strict standard of review was upheld in 
subsequent years. 135 Furthermore, Graham is particularly 
important to this Comment's analysis of the proper standard of 
review to apply to the Medicaid cuts currently affecting legal 
immigrant children and pregnant women in Maryland, as the state 
actions at issue in both cases are similar. 136 . 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO MEDICAID 
LAWS AT THE STATE LEVEL 
A. What Constitutional Standard to Apply 
Since the enactment of PR WORA, which authorizes states to 
discriminate against noncitizens in providing welfare benefits, state 
courts facing constitutional challenges to their laws have reached 
different results on statutes which draw distinctions based on 
alienage. 137 In addition, state courts have differed in their 
application of standards of review. 
For instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Doe 
v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 138 applied the rational 
basis test to and upheld a state law which created a residency 
requirement for a supplemental aid program created to benefit 
noncitizens.139 The Doe Court's decision relied heavily on the fact 
that because the supplemental aid program was only available to 
noncitizens, and not to citizens, there was no distinction between 
citizens and noncitizens to compel the application of a strict 
scrutiny test. 140 
134. Id. at 372, 376. 
135. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. I (1977); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects, 
& Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 
717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). 
136. See infra Part VI(B). 
137. See Michael Fix & Jeffrey Passel, The Scope and Impact of Welfare Reform's 
Immigrant Provisions, URB. INST. (Assessing the New Federalism, Washington, 
D.C.), Jan. 2002, at II. 
138. 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002). In this case, Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a 
declaration that the six-month residency requirement violated the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. Id. Plaintiffs contended that the statute violated the equal 
protection rights of legal immigrants by imposing the residency requirement on 
some legal immigrants while not imposing it on other legal immigrants. /d. at 
414. 
139. /d. at 407, 414. 
140. /d. at 414. The court stated that "the appropriate standard of review in these 
circumstances depends on the nature of the classification that creates the 
distinction between the subgroup of aliens." Id. The court concluded that 
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In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals in Aliessa v. 
Novello 141 applied the strict scrutiny test to a state welfare law 
which denied Medicaid to some noncitizens. 142 
New York's highest court was charged with analyzing the 
constitutionality of Social Services Law § 122,143 which denied 
state Medicaid benefits to plaintiffs based on their status as legal 
aliens. 144 Plaintiffs were legal residents of the United States who 
suffered from serious illnesses, and who would have qualified for 
state Medicaid benefits prior to the enactment of Social Services 
Law § 122.145 Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that this 
provision violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the New 
York State Constitution and the United States Constitution. 146 
Before reaching the New York Court of Appeals, a lower court 
held that Social Services Law § 122 did not improperly 
discriminate on the basis of alienage; thus, it did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution nor the 
New York State Constitution. 147 To reach its conclusion, the 
lower court applied the rational basis standard of review, drawing 
from its holding in a prior case that state action was subject to 
rational review and not strict scrutiny where the state acted 
pursuant to federal immigration legislation. 148 
The Court of Appeals of New York disagreed with the lower 
court and applied strict scrutiny to the new law, finding that the 
classification was based on alienage. 149 The court concluded that 
the state provision was subject to heightened scrutiny because it 
was a product of the federal law which impermissibly authorized 
states to adopt divergent laws on eligibility for federal and state 
funded Medicaid. 150 The court drew from language in the Graham 
because the classification was Massachusetts residency, the proper standard of 
review was rational basis. Id. 
141. 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001). 
142. Id. 
143. N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAW § 122 (McKinney 2006). 
144. See Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1088. This law was enacted under the New York 
State Welfare Reform Act of 1997 in response to and in furtherance of Congress' 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 
Aliessa v. Novello, 274 A.D.2d 347, 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). According to 
the new law, eligibility for Medicaid is dependent on whether the immigrant is 
qualified under PRWORA and whether the immigrant entered the country on or 
after August 22, 1999. Id. at 347-48. However, the new law stipulates that any 
immigrant who does not meet the federal definition of "qualified" can still 
receive Medicaid coverage for emergency services. Id. at 347. 
145. See Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1088. 
146. Id. at 1088-89. 
147. Aliessa v. Novello, 274 A.D.2d at 349. 
148. See id. at 348 (referring to its decision in Alvarino v. Wing, 261 A.D.2d 255 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999». 
149. Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1098-99. 
150. Id. 
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case which stated that Congress does not have the power to 
authorize individual states to violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
and that allowing states to adopt different laws regarding 
citizenship requirements for eligibility for federally supported 
welfare programs would contravene Congress' power to establish a 
uniform rule of naturalization. 151 Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeals of New York found that because the federal law 
authorized states to decide which aliens are eligible for state 
Medicaid, the federal law went "significantly beyond what the 
Graham court declared constitutionally questionable.,,152 For the 
above reasons, the court applied strict scrutiny to Social Services 
Law § 122 and found it to be a violation of both federal and state 
constitutions. 153 
B. An Equal Protection Argument in Maryland 
In light of the analyses and holdings of state courts on 
constitutional issues surrounding laws on welfare and Medicaid 
benefits, a question arises as to what level of scrutiny a Maryland 
court will apply to the recent restrictions on eligibility. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Perez, while not definitive 
on the main constitutional issue, does indicate which standard of 
review should be applied to the merits of the case, since the first 
factor to consider when issuing a preliminary injunction is the 
likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits. 154 The 
court engaged in a lengthy discussion of past federal and state 
statutes that discriminated on the basis of alienage and mentioned 
which standards of review were applied to determine their 
constitutionality. 155 The court explained that "the State may not 
act independently in a discriminatory manner with regard to 
distributing State-funded medical benefits to lawful resident aliens 
unless it survives a strict scrutiny standard of review.,,156 The 
court ultimately decided that the State's fiscal reasons for creating 
restrictions to Medicaid eligibility did not survive such a test. 157 
Prior to discussing the proper scrutiny that a court should apply 
to the Medicaid eligibility restrictions, it is necessary to emphasize 
that Maryland extends to its residents a constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection. 158 Where legal classifications involve 
151. Id. at 1095-96. 
152. Id. at 1098. 
153. Id. 
154. 2006 Md. LEXIS *21. 
155. Id. at *23-65. 
156. Id. at *58. 
157. Id. at *65-66. 
158. See MD. CONST. art. 24 ("That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or 
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any 
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discrimination, however, they are not always unconstitutional, so 
long as the classification is reasonable in relation to the objectives 
of the law, and survives the scrutiny undertaken by the court. 159 
Thus, the outcome in a Maryland court, as in any court, likely 
depends on the reasonableness of the classification of the act or 
statute. 
Here, the budget cut has targeted only legal immigrant children 
and pregnant women, on the basis that they are not citizens of the 
United States nor have they resided in the country for more than 
five years. 160 Thus, a distinction has been drawn with regard to 
alienage. Typically, a classification based on alienage is 
considered "inherentl(' suspect" and warrants application of the 
strict scrutiny test. 16 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court in 
Graham stated, "Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 
'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial 
solicitude is appropriate." 162 
Moreover, the Aliessa case supports this Comment's stance that 
a Maryland court should apply strict scrutiny. As mentioned 
previously, the courts in New York analyzed the constitutionality 
of New York Social Services § 122, which, like the recent 
distinction drawn in Maryland, qualified aliens for eligibility based 
on years of residency in the United States. 163 The Aliessa court, 
which relied on the Graham Court's view that aliens are a class in 
need of heightened scrutiny, applied the strict scrutiny test to 
Social Services Law § 122.164 In light of both the similarities 
between the New York law at issue in Aliessa and the budgetary 
cut in Maryland, and the class of people affected by the restraints, 
a Maryland court should apply the strict scrutiny test to the State's 
cuts in Medicaid funding for legal immigrants. 
1. Application of Strict Scrutiny 
In order to survive a strict scrutiny analysis, the State must 
show that its discriminatory act is "narrowly tailored" to serve a 
manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the 
judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land. "). 
159. See JEROME A. BARRON & c. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 274-75 (West Group, 6th ed. 2005). 
160. See supra Part I. 
161. BARRON & DIENES, supra note 159, at 320. However, there is an exception to 
this strict scrutiny principal that allows aliens to be excluded from "political 
functions," such as voting or jobs that are political in nature. ld. at 321. In such a 
case, only a rational basis is needed to overcome the discrimination based on 
alienage. Id. 
162. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citations omitted). 
163. See supra Part VI(A). 
164. See supra Part VI(A). 
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"compelling state interest." 165 In this sense, "the validity of the 
particular classification" is addressed by "focusing on closeness of 
the fit between the classification ... and the government objective 
or interest.,,166 Thus, an analysis of the State's budgetary cut can 
begin with whether there is a sufficient government interest. 
a. Is There a Compelling Government Interest? 
The recent cut to Medicaid, which has affected immigrant 
children and presnant women, was part of an effort to decrease 
Medicaid costs. I 7 The Supreme Court stated in Graham that the 
'justification of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and 
unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens.,,168 
The Supreme Court has presided over many cases in which the 
government has alleged a fiscal interest as the reason to distinguish 
between citizens and noncitizens, or even classes of citizens, and 
the Court has failed to find that financial constraints constitute a 
compelling interest. 169 Likewise, Maryland courts have addressed 
the issue of whether financial concerns can be justifications for 
discriminatory statutes, and they have concluded that it is not 
. 110 appropnate. 
Moreover, in light of the State's $1 billion surplus for the fiscal 
year 2005, which was announced only weeks after the budgetary 
cuts took effect, the elimination of $7 million in health care 
expenditures to the detriment of immigrant children and pregnant 
women is not prudent. 171 
Lastly, because the Welfare Innovation Act of 1997 was 
enacted to provide coverage for legal immigrant children and 
pregnant women who became ineligible after PRWORA was 
enacted, the Governor's cuts have disenfranchised individuals who 
165. See KAPLIN, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
166. KAPLIN, supra note 20, at 271. This is also known as "focusing on the degree of 
congruence between the means and the ends." !d. 
167. See Wagner, supra note I. 
168. Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 376 (1971) (quoting Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. 
Supp. 250, 253 (1970)). 
169. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support for Preliminary Injunction, at 12-13 
(citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). 
170. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support for Preliminary Injunction, at 13-14 
(explaining that while a Maryland court has never dealt with a fiscal concern in 
relation to a statute discriminating on the basis of alienage, the Court of Appeals, 
in Maryland v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 724 (1981), held that financial savings 
does not serve as a sufficient justification even when non-suspect classes are 
involved). 
171. Press Release, Governor Ehrlich Announces More Than $1 Billion Surplus (July 
19,2005), available at 
http://www.gov.state.md.us/pressreleases/2005/20050719_lbill.html; see also 
infra note 175. 
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are legally entitled to the benefits. l72 Thus, this State act can be 
viewed not only as discrimination based on alienage, but also a 
denial of equal protection to individuals who are legally entitled to 
the benefits. 173 Regardless of this distinction, the State of 
Maryland has not alleged a compelling interest sufficient to pass 
the strict scrutiny test. 
b. A Plethora of Policy Concerns 
The alleged fiscal concerns underlying the budgetary cut are not 
the only reasons why the restriction fails to pass strict scrutiny. 
There are a host of policy concerns which create a larger obstacle 
for the State to overcome in trying to justify the cuts to medical 
assistance. These include impacts on the health care system, 
impacts on the health of uninsured immigrants, and public health 
concerns. In addition, there are strong policy arguments with 
regard to the value of prenatal care and health care coverage for 
children. Lastly, the current opposition from legislators and health 
experts in Maryland illustrates the need to restore health care 
coverage to the immigrants who have been affected by the 
Governor's eligibility restrictions. 
1. Impacts on the Health Care System 
The denial of health care coverage to low-income immigrants 
has serious impacts on the health care system. Because emergency 
Medicaid coverage is still provided, regardless of immigration 
status,174 immigrants are forced to seek emergency room care 
when they need medical assistance rather than make less costly 
visits to physicians. 175 Hospitals, including D.C. Children's 
Hospital, which serves more Maryland children than all but one 
hospital in Maryland, expect the amounts which it must absorb in 
uncompensated care to increase significantly.176 In addition, in 
light of immigrants' rights to seek emergency, rather than 
preventive, care, and in light of the federal Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), which requires 
J;wspitals to screen for and treat emergency conditions without first 
inquiring about a patient's insurance status, it is likely that the 
172. See Opinion and Order Regarding Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary Injunction, 
at 13-14, Perez v. Ehrlich, No. 265850-V (Montgomery County Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 
2006). 
173. Id. 
174. Broder, supra note 72. 
175. Walter A. Ewing, Not Getting What They Paid For: Limiting Immigrants' Access 
to Benefits Hurts Families Without Reducing Healthcare Costs, AM. IMMIGR. L. 
FOUND. (Immigration Policy Center, Washington, D.C.), June 2003, available at 
http://www.ailf.org/ipc/BenefitsPrint.asp. 
176. Wagner, supra note 1. 
98 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 36 
demands on emergency departments will increase. l77 A potential 
consequence might be that those who go to the emergency 
department with insurance and true medical emergencies might 
encounter delays in screening and treatment because emergency 
rooms are faced with an overall increase in uninsured patients who 
cannot seek care elsewhere. 
In addition to hospital emergency rooms, community clinics are 
likely to be affected, as immigrants who face linguistic and cultural 
barriers might be more inclined to seek care within their 
communities. 178 In Maryland, for instance, Montgomery, Prince 
George's, and Howard Counties feel the strain in trying to provide 
health care services to immigrants who have become ineligible for 
benefits. 179 Howard County's clinic, in particular, has predicted an 
increase in its prenatal care patients by more than twenty 
percent. 180 Thus, the concern remains that by curtailing access to 
non-emergency services, such as preventive and prenatal care, 
safety net facilities which already face staffing shortages and 
financial problems will be overburdened. 181 
Some politicians and health care experts have acknowledged 
that limiting access to health care benefits only increases costs to 
the public health system. 182 In his proposal to expand Medicaid 
coverage for legal immigrants, U.S. Senator Bob Graham stated 
that, "the reality is that states will pay these costs regardless-by 
funding optional Medicaid programs or by paying for emergency 
room visits. Why not spend the money on the front end?,,183 
11. Impacts on the H~alth of the Uninsured 
Recent figures by the U.S. Census Bureau show that immigrants 
were three times as likely as U.S.-born residents to lack health 
insurance. 184 Studies conducted after 1996 also revealed that the 
majority of noncitizens and their children were at high risk of 
being uninsured and faced serious gaps in receiving health care and 
177. Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the 
Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 145,151,166-67 (2004). 
178. Lisa Cacari Stone & Ana Guillermina Quiroz-Gibson, "Puerta Abierta 0 Puerta 
Cerrada? Citizenship, Health Care, and Welfare Reform in New Mexico, in 
IMMIGRANTS, WELFARE REFORM, AND THE POVERTY OF POLICY 72-73 (Philip 
Kretsedemas & Ana Aparicio eds., Praeger Publishers 2004). 
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public benefits. 18s This was the result of both the changes to 
eligibility for public benefits in 1996, and also the high costs of 
private health insurance. 186 
Due to the many barriers in obtaining health care coverage, 
immigrants since 1996 have been hesitant to seek medical care or 
have missed screenings and treatment for health problems. 187 
They often delay seeking care until it becomes an emergency, at 
which time they use the emergency room as a source of regular 
care. 188 Using the emergency room for regular care seriously 
affects both the quality and continuity of care that these 
immigrants receive, as emergency rooms are typically 
overcrowded and overburdened. 189 
Moreover, the experience in some immigrant commumtIes is 
that health care providers deny the same quality of medical care to 
uninsured immigrants as offered to insured citizens. 19o This has 
led some immigrant communities to distrust hospitals and to prefer 
community clinics, which can also affect the quality of medical 
care. 191 Overall, policies that deter immigrants from utilizing 
Medicaid likely play a role in increasing disparities in access to 
health care. 192 
iii. Public Health Concerns 
The fundamental principles of public health emphasize the 
improvement of health across communities, and denying health 
care access to children, pregnant women, and persons at risk for 
communicable diseases based on their immigration status is 
contrary to this goal. I93 Immigrants are less likely to have health 
insurance than citizens, and are often more likely to be exposed to 
communicable diseases in their native countries than are citizens in 
the United States. 194 Tuberculosis is one such communicable 
disease which has substantially higher rates of incidents in foreign-
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186. See id. at 72-74. 
187. Id. at 74. 
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born persons than in U.S.-born residents. 195 There are forms of 
this disease which are latent and which tend not to show any 
symptoms. 196 Although, under PRWORA, all immigrants remain 
eligible for the immunization and treatment of communicable 
disease symptoms, few patients can self-diagnose the symptoms, 
such as cough, fatigue, and fever as related to communicable 
diseases like tuberculosis. 197 Thus, by denying immigrants access 
to preventive health care services, which could lead to early 
detection and tre.atment of dangerou,s diseases, the health of 
immigrants is compromised. 198 In addition, this may jeopardize 
the health of the citizens of the United States, whose exposure to 
such diseases increases. 199 
Furthermore, the denial of prenatal care to low-income 
immigrants is counterproductive from a public health 
perspective.2oo Because children born to immigrants in the United 
States are automatically eligible for publicly-funded benefits, the 
taxpayer becomes "responsible for the costs associated with the 
children's health conditions that could have been prevented 
through adequate prenatal care.,,201 Thus, the costs to communities 
can be prevented or reduced by investment in preventive care, 
which is necessary to improve health in communities. 202 
IV. The Value of Prenatal Care 
Prenatal care is broadly defined as including the "diagnosis of 
pregnancy; the medical, educational, social and nutritional services 
needed to enhance the health and well-being of the woman and 
fetus during pregnancy; and the counseling and assistance required 
to plan for labor and delivery, postpartum care for the mother, and 
pediatric care for the newborn.,,203 There is widespread agreement 
among practitioners and policy makers in the health care field that 
prenatal care is crucial to the health of the pregnant woman and her 
child. 204 In addition, there is evidence that "prenatal care is 
especially important for women at increased medical or social 
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risk.,,205 Moreover, evidence reveals both medical and economic 
values to prenatal care. 206 
With regard to its medical value, studies have linked 
insufficient prenatal care to many health risks, including low birth-
weight, premature delivery, birth defects, and sexually transmitted 
diseases such as HIV. 207 These health problems can affect the 
child not only at birth and through infancy, but also throughout 
childhood.208 For example, low birth-weight infants are 
susceptible to serious birth defects which can lead to future 
learning and behavioral problems, heart problems, and poor 
vision. 209 
In terms of its economic value, health care experts agree that 
prenatal care is cost-effective.2 \0 Studies have revealed that every 
dollar spent on prenatal care can save $3.38 in direct health care 
costs for low birth-weight infants in the first year of life. 211 In 
addition, for every dollar invested in preventive care, $4.63 can be 
saved in long-term costs, which include health care, childcare, and 
special education.212 For example, a low birth-weight baby with a 
mental or physical handicap will require a lifetime of costly care, 
such as disability and other social programs.213 Furthermore, 
adequate prenatal care can help reduce indirect costs to society, 
such as lost productivity and wages of individuals who are 
incapable of reaching their full potentia1.214 
v. Children Need Effective Health Care Coverage 
There is significant evidence that healthy children will become 
healthy adults; thus there are social, ethical, and economic 
incentives to ensure that children are as healthy as possible.215 The 
health of children is affected by laws and policies created by the 
federal and state governments, including eligibility for publicly-
funded insurance. 216 Health insurance, itself, has played a role in 
children's health policy and their access to and use of health care 
services. 217 In contrast to all other industrialized nations, there 
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remains a large proportion of uninsured children in the United 
States. 218 Because Medicaid coverage has historically provided 
otherwise uninsur<;:d children with access to health care, Medicaid 
has been associated with better birth outcomes and lower rates of 
preventable illness. 219 Thus, one can draw a parallel between 
Medicaid coverage for children and improved health. 
With regard to immigrant children, the American Academy of 
Pediatrics has advocated the provision of health care to all 
children, regardless of immigration status. 220 Young children of 
immigrant parents are more likely to be uninsured, in fair or poor 
health, and lack a usual place to receive preventive care. 221 Recent 
studies have shown that new immigrants do not typically have 
access to employer-sponsored health benefits, and if they do, they 
often cannot afford dependent coverage. 222 It follows that recent 
changes in welfare policy which affect eligibility for publicly-
funded health programs have impaired the access of immigrant 
children to necessary health services. 223 Given the correlation 
between low incomes, lack of health insurance coverage, and lack 
of access to health care services, public coverage of health care is 
critical for children in immigrant families. 224 
vi. Maryland Legislators and Health Experts Speak Out 
Many Maryland lawmakers and government officials were 
quick to oppose the Governor's plan to cut Medicaid funding for 
legal immigrant children and pregnant women. 225 Some state 
lawmakers lobbied the Governor to restore $1.5 million to continue 
coverage of pregnant women already enrolled in prenatal care 
programs. 226 In July 2005, following the announcement of a 
surplus, the Governor complied with this request. 227 Comptroller 
William Donald Schaefer was one such Maryland official who 
pressured the Governor to restore funding for immigrant health 
care. 228 In addition, Montgomery County Executive Douglas 
Duncan issued a letter to the Governor indicating how many 
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219. Id. 
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Montgomery County immigrants would be affected by the cuts and 
calling the cuts "unconscionable.,,229 More recently, the Maryland 
Legislature has proposed a bill which would restore at least $7 
million in funding for health care services of legal immigrant 
children and pregnant women for the 2007 fiscal year. 230 In 
addition, this bill seeks the inclusion of at least $7 million, for 
fiscal years 2008 and beyond, into the Medical Assistance Program 
budget in order to provide medical assistance to this segment of the 
immigrant population. 231 
Moreover, several health care professionals have advised 
legislators of the consequences of Medicaid cuts to immigrant 
children and pregnant women. 232 Howard County's Health Officer 
Peggy Borenstein has stated that cutting funding for prenatal care 
is counterproductive and that the Health Department would have 
difficulty in continuing its provision of prenatal care to immigrant 
women without more help from the State. 233 Also, Montgomery 
County Health Officer Dr. Ulder Tillman has emphasized that, by 
removing preventive care, immigrants will be forced to use 
emergency rooms, which in turn increases health care costs in the 
country.234 Dr. Tillman also stated that failing to provide prenatal 
care for women does not make "good medical or public health 
sense. ,,235 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The State of Maryland, by removing a segment of the legal 
immigrant population from Medicaid eligibility, has violated the 
equal protection rights guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, Article 24, and has adopted an unfair and unhealthy 
attitude towards immigrant children and pregnant women. 236 
Based on Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Graham v. 
Richardson, and also law in other states, as evidenced by Aliessa v. 
Novello, the Maryland courts should analyze Perez v. Ehrlich, by 
applying the strict scrutiny standard. 237 Accordingly, a Maryland 
court should find that the Governor's budgetary cut does not pass 
the strict scrutiny test, as the State does not allege an interest so 
compelling as to justify the discrimination against noncitizens. 238 
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Inclusive in this balancing of state and individual interests are 
many factors which make it unfair and counterproductive to 
preclude those who are already disadvantaged from basic health 
care coverage. 239 For these reasons, the Maryland courts, by way 
of Perez v. Ehrlich, should deem the restrictions imposed on 
immigrant children and pregnant women unconstitutional. Such a 
holding would adhere to equal protection jurisprudence concerning 
discrimination against immigrants and is vital to ensuring a healthy 
and productive immigrant population in the State. 
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